




HEI Working Paper No: 08/2006 
 
How Much Information Should 
Interest Rate-Setting  
Central Banks Reveal? 
 
 
Pierre Gosselin, Aileen Lotz,  
and Charles Wyplosz 
Graduate Institute of International Studies 
 
Abstract 
Morris and Shin (2002) have shown that a central bank may be too 
transparent if the private sector pays too much attention to its possible 
imprecise signals simply because they are common knowledge. In 
their model, the central bank faces a binary choice: to reveal or not to 
reveal its information. This paper extends their model to the more 
realistic case where the central bank must anyway convey some 
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Abstract
Morris and Shin (2002) have shown that a central bank may be
too transparent if the private sector pays too much attention to its
possible imprecise signals simply because they are common knowl-
edge. In their model, the central bank faces a binary choice: to reveal
or not to reveal its information. This paper extends their model to
the more realistic case where the central bank must anyway convey
some information by setting the interest rate. This situation radically
changes the conclusions. In many cases, full transparency is socially
optimal. In other instances the central bank can distill information to
either manipulate private sector expectations in a way that reduces
the common knowledge e⁄ect or to reduce the unavoidable informa-
tion content of the interest rate. In no circumstance is the option of
only setting the interest rate socially optimal.
1 Introduction
In a series of papers Amato, Morris and Shin (2002, 2003) and Morris and
Shin (2002, 2005) have argued that central banks should not reveal all the
information at their disposal.1 This is result stands in contrast with another
view, developed by Blinder (1998), that central banks should be as transpar-
ent as possible. The case for transparency rests on the need for the central
1These papers share a common model and di⁄er only by their emphasis on particular
issues. In what follows we refer to all of them when we quote Morris and Shin (2002),
denoted as M&S.
1bank to a⁄ect expectation-driven channels of transmission such as long-term
interest rates, asset prices and exchange rates. In this view, monetary policy
e⁄ectiveness is enhanced when the private sector understands the intentions
of the central bank. The same conclusion can be derived when consider-
ing expectations-augmented Phillips curves; the in￿ ation-output trade-o⁄ is
reduced when the central bank is credible and credibility is best served by
transparency.
M&S are not the ￿rst ones to argue for less than full transparency. The
case for ￿ constructive ambiguity￿has been initially advanced by Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986). It rests on two assumptions: 1) only unanticipated
money matters (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) and 2) the central bank pref-
erences are not precisely known by the public (Vickers, 1986). Under these
combined assumptions, some degree of opacity enhances monetary policy ef-
fectiveness because a fully transparent central bank cannot create surprises.2
These assumptions have become less appealing. The ￿ only unanticipated
money matter￿view has been convincingly criticized by McCallum (1995)
and Blinder (1998). The idea that the central bank conceals its preferences
to pursue its own agenda may have been realistic, but it does not sit well with
the tendency to clearly specify the objectives of monetary policy, as is the
case with the increasingly popular in￿ ation targeting strategy. In addition
central bank secrecy raises a huge range of issues about accountability when
monetary policy is delegated to independent central banks.
The striking feature of the results of M&S is that they do not require
any of these assumptions. The argument rests instead on three di⁄erent
assumptions: 1) the information available to both the central bank and the
private sector is noisy; 2) the central bank￿ s signals are seen by everyone
in the private sector; and 3) private sector agent forecasts must not just
be as precise as possible, they must be as close as possible to the consensus
forecast. The last assumption, which goes back to Keynes￿celebrated beauty
contest e⁄ect, re￿ ects the basic principle that it is relative prices that matter
in competitive markets. An implication of the beauty contest assumption
is that everyone knows that everyone else observes the same central bank
signals. As a consequence is the common knowledge e⁄ect: relative to private
information, central bank signals receive undue attention in the sense that
their impact will not just re￿ ect their quality. It follows that when the
quality of central bank signals is not good enough to overcome the weight that
they receive, it may be desirable for the central bank to withhold releasing
its information. Svensson (2005) observes that, in practice, the quality of
central bank signals is unlikely to be su¢ ciently poor to justify withholding
2For review of this literature, see Geraats (2002).
2information.
We accept the three basic assumptions because they are obviously realis-
tic, but we question a fourth assumption made by M&S. In their model the
central bank faces the choice of releasing either no information at all or all
its information. It is unrealistic that a central bank can withhold all of its
information. If only by setting the interest rate, the central bank is forced to
reveal some information. The question then is not black-and-white - reveal
or not reveal - and this changes the question to be asked and, it turns out,
the answers.
The question now becomes: given that the central bank anyway releases
some noisy information, the interest rate, should it also reveal all the detailed
information that was used in its decision? The answer is that it is generally
desirable for the central bank to release some information in addition to
setting the interest rate. We ￿nd many cases where, in fact, it is desirable
for the central bank to be fully transparent and to release all its information.
This result emerges even in the presence of the common knowledge e⁄ect
implied by the three assumptions previously mentioned.
The next section presents our model, an extension of M&S to the case
where there are two price fundamentals. This extension is needed as we
assume throughout that the central bank optimally sets and publishes the
interest rate. Section 3 considers the case where the variances of the central
bank and private sector signals are perfectly known to both the central bank
and the private sector. Depending on the strength of the common knowledge
e⁄ect, it may or may not be desirable for the central bank to be transparent.
Section 4 introduces one more degree of possible transparency by allowing
for the precision of the private sector signals to be unknown to the central
bank. Since the central bank must set the interest rate, and is assumed to do
so by minimizing its expectation of the private sector loss function, it must
form a forecast of the private sector information precision. In this situation,
the central bank may simply publish its chosen interest rate, or release its
forecast of the private sector information precision, or be fully transparent
and also release its signals. This section presents the outcome in the three
cases and evaluates the welfare implications. Most of these results remain
valid when private sector information precision is also unknown to the the
private sector itself, as is brie￿ y indicated in Section 5. The last section
concludes.
32 Central Banking with an Interest Rate In-
strument
2.1 Monetary policy
Since we assume that the central bank publishes a signal by setting the in-
terest rate, we need to extend the model of M&S to allow for more than one
fundamental. If there were only one fundamental, the interest rate decision
would be fully revealing, unless the central bank were intentionally intro-
ducing noise in its monetary policy decisions in order to manipulate private
sector expectations, for example by creating surprises or by concealing its
true preferences. We do not deal with these issues here as we assume that
the central bank maximizes the social welfare, i.e. that its preferences are the
same as those of the private sector and thus perfectly well known. To keep
matters as simple as possible, we assume that there are two fundamentals
that both the central bank and the private sector must forecast.3
As M&S, we consider the Lucas-Phelps island parable. There is one
good produced by an in￿nite number of private producers i spread over the
unit interval. Each private producer lives on one island and has limited







where Ei is the expectation conditional on information available in island
i and p is the aggregate price index
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where ￿ = (￿1;￿2)0 is a vector of two fundamentals and A = (A1;A2)
is a vector of structural parameters. Without any loss of generality, we set
(A1;A2) = (1;1). This merely implies normalizing the two fundamentals
accordingly. The market equilibrium condition yields:
(1) p
i = (1 ￿ r)E
i(￿) + rE
i(p)
with r = b=(1 + b) 2 [0;1].4
3The model can be generalized to more than two fundamentals. It does not seem that
this generalization would a⁄ect our results.
4There are other possible interpretations of 1. For example,Woodford (2003) derives a
similar price setting for monopolistically competive ￿rms.
4M&S interpret their single fundamental as the money supply. Yet, in
their framework the money supply is not controlled by the central bank
whose sole function if to forecast this variable, possibly with less precision
than the private sector. This characterization of monetary policy is unsatis-
factory and, as it turns out, deeply a⁄ects the issue of transparency. If the
central bank were to directly set the money supply, there would be no issue
of transparency. Presumably, the central bank sets the interest rate, which
in turn a⁄ects the money supply but with signi￿cant noise. In that case the
private sector must observe the interest rate and both the central bank and
the private sector infer from this observation the likely level of the money
supply. In that case, the choice of the interest rate must be related to the
central bank￿ s forecast of the fundamental.
Short of fully specifying how monetary policy operates (channels of mone-
tary policy e⁄ects, the instrument and the targets), we still need to recognize
that the central bank uses one instrument to a⁄ect some intermediate tar-
get(s). To that e⁄ect, we depart from M&S in two ways. First, we allow
for two fundamentals, which are meant to represent exogenous variables or
intermediate targets that a⁄ect demand. Among the ￿rst category, one can
think of foreign demand, ￿scal policy or exogenous shocks. The intermediate
targets can be the money supply, long-term interest rates, asset prices or
the exchange rate. Second, we assume that the instrument is the short-term
interest rate R, which is set by the central bank and observed by the private
sector. In order to optimally set the interest rate, the central bank makes the
best possible use of its information about the fundamentals. Denoting e ￿1 and
e ￿1 the information that the central bank has regarding the two fundamentals,
we assume that it uses a linear rule of the type:
(2) R = ￿e ￿1 + ￿e ￿2
Without loss of generality, we impose the restriction ￿ + ￿ = 1. This
restriction amounts to normalizing the interest rate R. In accordance with
private sector preferences, the central bank chooses the short-term interest
rate that minimizes the social loss function:






based on its own information set. The central bank observes the funda-
mentals with additive noise
e ￿k = ￿k + "k k = 1;2
5where the noise terms "1 and "2 are identically and independently dis-
tributed with zero mean and variance V￿. Obviously, in choosing ￿ and ￿ the
central bank must take into account how the private sector sets its prices.
2.2 The Private sector
Each island producer i sets its price according to (1), using available privately
information on the fundamentals. We assume that producer i receives a noisy
signal for each in the fundamentals:
x
i
k = ￿k + ￿
i
k k = 1;2
where the noise terms ￿i
k are independently distributed with zero mean
and variance V￿;k. While the signals on each of the two fundamentals are
identically distributed across all producers, their perceived variance may dif-
fer across the fundamentals (we may have V￿;1 6= V￿;2) and the variance
perceived by the producers may di⁄er from the variance perceived by the
central bank (i.e. we may have V￿;k 6= V"). The perceived variances re￿ ect
the quality of information, which plays a central role in the analysis. As-
suming V ("1) = V ("2) and V (￿1) 6= V (￿2) is the simplest way of introducing
two meaningfully distinct fundamentals. Imposing V ("1) = V ("2) does not
restrict the generality of the model, it merely implies a normalization of ~ ￿1
and ~ ￿2. If, in addition we were to allow for V (￿1) = V (￿2), we would have
a symmetric case where the two signals are seen by both the central bank
and the private sector drawn from the same distribution but with di⁄erent
accuracy. The resulting asymmetry of treatment of the private sector and the
central bank is meant to re￿ ect the notion that the former is heterogenous.
The beauty contest parameter r re￿ ects the reactivity producers to each
other￿ s expectations. It implies that each producer must guess what all
the other producers will guess, while they themselves guess everyone else￿ s
guess. Since each producer receives her own idiosyncratic information ￿i
k,
this is no trivial task. Iterating (1) in￿nitely, and denoting ￿ En the nth order
expectation, the optimal pricing decision is:
(4) p





i ￿ ￿ E
n(A￿)
￿
which exists when 0 < r < 1.
Thus each producer will set her own price in order to stay as close as
possible to her estimate of the fundamental combination A￿ that drives the
aggregate price index ￿ p. Her loss will be therefore Li = (pi ￿ A￿)2, which
6justi￿es the central bank loss function (3) in this one-shot game. Since all
producers are identical save for the white noise terms ￿i
k that they receive
individually, the central bank objective can be treated as ECB(pi ￿ A￿)2.
We can now look for the equilibrium outcome, where the central bank
optimally chooses ￿ and ￿ to set the short-term interest rate R which is then
observed by the private sector. The central bank decision involves forecast-
ing pi, which requires guessing the private sector price setting behavior (4).
The question is whether the central bank should, in addition, reveal its own
information about the fundamentals ~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2? In order to deal with that
question, we must specify carefully what is known by the central bank and
by the private sector about the distribution of noises "k and ￿i
k, for k = 1;2.
We assume that everyone knows that the means are zero but what about
the variances V" and V￿;k? We consider three cases: when the variances are
known to all, when private sector variances are only known by the private
sector and when private sector variances are unknown to all.
3 The variances are common knowledge
We start with the simplest case, when the variances of the noise terms V" and
V￿;k are known by everyone, both the central bank and the private sector.
We ￿rst consider that the central bank does not reveal its private information
~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2; it only announces the interest rate R, which the sector known is
set optimally as a linear function of ~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2. We then ask whether welfare
improves when the central bank releases its information ~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2.
It will prove helpful to simplify the notations as follows. Let ￿ = V￿;1=V￿;2
be the relative variance of private sector signals on the two fundamentals and
denote V￿ = V￿;2 so that:
V￿;1 = ￿V￿;2 = ￿V￿








Finally, we denote ￿ =
￿
￿. This ratio represents the central bank decision
when it sets the interest rate according to (2) since we normalized the signals
such that ￿ + ￿ = 1, ￿ . Note that ￿ = 1; corresponds to the symmetric
7case where there is no discrepancy between the central bank and the private
sector assessment of relative variances.
3.1 The central bank only reveals its interest rate
Assuming that the central bank sets the interest rate R according to (2),










































Agent i￿ s expectation of the combined fundamentals, which enters her




(￿1 + ￿￿2)R + [(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿2￿]x
i










(’1 + ￿’2)R + [(1 ￿ ’1) ￿ ’2￿]x
i




where ’1 and ’2 are:
(8) ’k =
￿k
1 ￿ r[1 ￿ (￿1 + ￿2)]
Because the interest rate is common knowledge, it receives more weight
than it should if based only on the precision of available information, as given
by (6). This can be seen by considering the case where r = 0, when agents
do not care about other agents￿expectations. In that case ’k = ￿k and
8the weights on R and the private signals xi
k in the pricing equation (7) are
exactly those that correspond to Bayesian signal extraction as in (5). When




The publication of the interest rate provides the central bank with a
tool to mitigate the common knowledge problem. Knowing that the interest
rate R excessively in￿ uences the private sector, like a benevolent ￿ ute-payer
sure to be followed by the crowds, the central bank can use its power to
steer private expectations in a socially desirable direction. Even though the
interest rate does not have any macroeconomic e⁄ect, it can play a useful
signaling role.5 Formally, the central bank sets ￿ to minimize the loss function
ECB (pi ￿ A￿)
2:
E
CB (pi ￿ A￿)


































The resulting loss is denoted L1 (￿) = Arg minL1 (￿;￿). The ￿rst order
condition @L1 (￿;￿)=@￿ = 0 is a fourth-order equation that cannot be easily
solved for an arbitrary value of ￿. We use the observation that the problem
at hand degenerates into a one-dimension fundamental when ￿ = 1, in which
case a solution is ￿ = 1 (we discuss another solution below). Accordingly
we focus on a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion of the ￿rst-order condition around
￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1:
(10) ￿ ￿ 1 =
(1 ￿ 3r + 2r2) +
￿
￿








In order to understand this result, consider two limit cases. First let
￿
￿
! 1, which corresponds to the case where the central bank information
is in￿nitely more precise than the private sector information. The result is
5Could the central bank eliminate the externality? This would require that ’k = ￿k




2￿)￿ + (1 + ￿
2)￿
= 1, which is impossible unless
￿ = 0, the limit case where the private sector signal precision is nil.
9￿ ’ 1. Since relatively accurate central bank signals ~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2 are of equal
precision (V ("1) = V ("2), it treats them equally. In the second polar case,
￿
￿
! 0, the private sector is in￿nitely better informed than the central bank.
By choosing ￿ ’ ￿, the central bank weighs the signals according to the
relative precision of the private sector forecasts. For intermediate values of
￿
￿
the central bank chooses ￿ to optimally shape private sector forecasts of ￿1
and ￿2 given the known precision of the signals. In this sense the central bank
manipulates private sector expectations to mitigate the common knowledge
e⁄ects.
For ￿ ’ 1 to be optimal (when ￿ ’ 1) the second order condition 1￿2r+
￿
￿
￿ 0 must be satis￿ed.6 This requires that the ￿ beauty contest￿weight r
be not too large given the ratio of the central bank information precision ￿
relative to the private sector precision ￿. When this is the case, private agents
are paying attention to each other expectations but not excessively so. The
maximum value of r declines when
￿
￿
becomes smaller since the combination
of a high degree of reactivity and poor central information precision results in




0, the optimal choice is ￿ = ￿1=￿ when ￿ is in the neighborhood of 1. This
solution implies that ￿ and ￿ become in￿nitely large in absolute value.7 We
further discuss this case below.
3.2 The central bank reveals the interest rate and its
signals
Transparency is achieved when the central bank fully reveals its information,
i.e. e ￿1 and e ￿2. In that case, the interest rate is not informative anymore.
Producer i now receives two signals for each of the two fundamentals: her
own signals xk.and the central bank signals e ￿k for k = 1;2. Optimal Bayesian
signal extraction leads to:
E




i(￿2) = ￿2e ￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)x
i
2 (11b)






















Since individual noises are white noise, we have
R ￿ E(xi
k)di = ￿k and therefore:
￿ E(A￿) = ￿1e ￿1 + ￿2e ￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2
Iterating this relation to compute pi = (1￿r)
P1
n=0 rnEi ￿ ￿ En(A￿)
￿
we have:
(13) pi = ’1~ ￿1 + ’2~ ￿2 + (1 ￿ ’1)x
i




’1 = (1 ￿ r)￿1 + r
￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿￿1
1 + (1 ￿ r)￿￿1
and ’2 = (1 ￿ r)￿2 + r
￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿￿2
1 + (1 ￿ r)￿￿2
This is exactly the same result as in M&S except that we allow for two
signals with di⁄erent variances for the private sector. We ￿nd the familiar
result that, because e ￿1 and e ￿2 are common knowledge, they receive excessive
weight in (13). To see this, note that when r = 0; i.e. when individual
producers have no incentive to guess what the others expect, ’k = ￿k for
k = 1;2 and the weights on e ￿k and xi
k in (13) exactly re￿ ect the precision of
the respective signals as given in (12). When r > 0, ’k > ￿k and the weights
on e ￿k are increased at the expense of the weights on xi
k.





￿2 = L2 (￿) =
￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)
2
[￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)]2 + ￿
￿￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)
2
[￿￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)]2
The central bank does not have any optimization to do since the interest
rate does a⁄ect the economy other than through its signal content, which is
uninformative with full transparency.
3.3 Welfare comparisons
The central bank has the choice between only revealing an optimally chosen
interest rate and revealing all its information (e ￿1 and e ￿2). In the latter
case, it gives up any possibility of manipulating private expectations to cope
with the common knowledge e⁄ect. Which strategy is best is therefore more
11complicated than in the case where the central bank does not have to set
the interest rate. In order to determine which is the best policy, we need
to compare L1 (￿) = Arg minL1 (￿;￿) and L2 (￿). Given how unwieldy these
expressions are, once again we examine the situation in the neighborhood of
the symmetric case where ￿ = 1.
3.3.1 Symmetric case
To start with, we consider the benchmark case ￿ = 1. Recall that the central
bank￿ s optimal interest decision is ￿ = 1 when the second-order condition
1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿
￿ 0 is satis￿ed. Then (9) and (14) show that:
(15) L2 (1) = L1 (1;1) = 2
￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)
2
[￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿]2
When the two fundamentals are drawn from the same distribution, it makes
no di⁄erence whether the central bank only publishes the interest rate or
whether it reveals all its information. In this case, as a linear combination of
the two signals, the interest rate is as informative as the signals themselves.
This equivalence result holds when the second-order condition is met, i.e.
when the relative information of the central bank is good enough given the
reactivity of individual producers to each other forecasts (
￿
￿
￿ 2r ￿ 1).
What happens instead when the precision of the central bank is lower








) < L1(1;￿) < L1(1;1) = L2(1)
Any ￿ will make releasing only the interest rate a better solution than being




= ￿1; given that we are in the neighborhood of ￿ = 1; this implies that
￿ and ￿ become in￿nitely large in absolute value and so does the variance of
R.
M&S observe that when the quality of the central bank information is
poor, it should not release any signals. Here, however, the central bank has
no choice, it must issue some signal as it cannot avoid setting the interest
rate. Aware that the interest rate is common knowledge and that its relative
precision is relatively poor, the central bank￿ s best strategy is to make the
interest rate as uninformative as it can. Of course, this conclusion only holds
because we assume that the interest rate plays no macroeconomic role. If it
12were, the central bank would face a trade-o⁄between the need for opacity and
good monetary policy. This important trade-o⁄ is left for future research.
3.3.2 Asymmetric case
Now, consider the asymmetric case where ￿ 6= 1 so that the two signals
received by the private sector are drawn from di⁄erent distributions and
each have a separate information value. We distinguish again between the
two solutions for ￿. When 1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿
￿ 0, in the neighborhood of ￿ = 1;
the optimal choice of the central bank is in the neighborhood of ￿ = 1 as in
(10). In this case:
(16) L1 (￿) ￿ L2 (￿) ’ ￿
1
2
















Irrespective of the relative precision of central bank and private sector
information, it is preferable for the central banks to only publish the interest
rate. This result di⁄ers from M&S who ￿nd that when
￿
￿
is large the central
bank should be fully transparent. The reason is that the central bank can
e⁄ectively use the interest rate to orient private sector expectations in a way
that mitigates the unavoidable common knowledge e⁄ect. Transparency, the
release of the signals ~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2, creates a common knowledge e⁄ect and
eliminates the information content of the interest rate and the associated








￿1, which implies a highly volatile interest rate. Then, the Appendix shows
that:
(17) L1 (￿) ￿ L2 (￿) ’
2
￿











Here again, the central bank does not reveal its information. As in Section
3.3.1, it seeks to become as opaque as it can since it is under obligation to
publish the interest rate even though it is relatively poorly informed given
the reactivity of the previous sector (
￿
￿
< 2r ￿ 1).
133.3.3 Assessment
When the precision of central and bank information is known, the case con-
sidered by M&S, we ￿nd that an interest-setting central bank should never
be transparent. We summarize our ￿nding so far as follows:
Proposition 1 When its information precision is known to be high, the cen-
tral bank does better by not being transparent. Instead it uses the interest rate
publication to manipulate the relatively poorly-informed private sector expec-
tations. When its information precision is low, it still does not release its
private information, but it also endeavors to become opaque by making the
interest rate highly volatile.
Note that these results di⁄er from M&S in two respects. First, even when
its information is highly precise, an interest rate-setting central bank should
not be transparent. Second, when its information is poor, the central bank
can still use the interest rate to limit the common knowledge e⁄ect.
4 The private sector precision is not known
So far, uncertainty only concerned the ￿rst moments of the fundamentals.
The second moments, the precision of information received by the central
banks and the private sector, were assumed to be common knowledge. It is
quite plausible, however that the precision of the signals itself is unknown.
Given the inherent complexity of this situation, we consider a simple
example. We now assume that neither the central bank nor the private
sector know V￿. On the other hand, both the central bank and the private
sector know V", the variance of the central bank signal. This postulated
asymmetry is logical as we focus on the role of common knowledge. Since
the central bank actions are closely watched by a wide group of observers,
it is plausible that much more is known about central bank signal precision
than about private signal precision.
We also need to specify who knows what. We assume that both the central
bank and the private sector mistakenly believe that their own estimates of
private signal variance, ECBV￿ and EprV￿, respectively, are accurate. In line
with the postulated asymmetry meant to capture central bank watching,
we further assume that the private sector realizes that the central bank is
mistaken, i.e. EprECBV￿ 6= EprV￿.
As before, we de￿ne the two private sector signal as xi
k = ￿k +￿i
k and we







= V￿;k 8i k = 1;2
Note that we still allow for the private sector signal variances of ￿
1 and
￿
2 to di⁄er (i.e. V￿;1 6= V￿;2). To keep matters simple, we assume that the
estimates of these variances are exogenous and di⁄er between the central









We start with the simplest case. We assume that the private sector in
fact knows its own precision, i.e. V
pr
￿;k = V￿;k. Since the private sector knows
that V CB
￿;k 6= V￿;k, it must forecast the central bank￿ s estimate. Again, we









A more elaborate model would allow for endogenous expectation forma-
tions, but this would require a much heavier setup with little additional
insight. Section 4 shows that removing the assumption V
pr
￿;k = V￿;k does not
signi￿cantly alter the conclusions. As previously, we normalize the private
sector variances around ~ V
pr
￿;2 and adopt the following notation:
~ V￿ = ~ V
pr













The uncertainty about signal precision now changes the notion of central
bank transparency. The private sector is interested in knowing not just the
central bank signals ~ ￿k but also the central bank forecasts V CB
￿;k of the private
sector signals. The latter only matters when the central bank does not reveal
its signals. Thus there are now three degrees of transparency: 1) the central
bank only publishes the interest rate; 2) the central bank reveals its estimates
of private sector variances V CB
￿;k ; and 3) the central bank reveals its signals
~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2.
4.1 The central bank only reveals the interest rate
When she observes the interest rate R and try to ￿gure out what is the cen-
tral bank reaction function, producer i must distinguish between her own
estimates V
pr
￿;k = V￿;k of V￿;k and those ~ V
pr
￿;k that she believes are made by
15the central bank. To do so, each producer applies the usual Bayesian signal
extraction method to interpret the interest rate on the basis of its own signals
xi
k. This allows producer i to form her expectation Ei(A￿) of the fundamen-
tals. But the producer also knows that the central bank reaction function
is set on the basis of its own mistaken expectations V CB
￿;k that the private
sector estimates as ~ V
pr
￿;k. Producer i must therefore also extract information
from the observed interest rate to infer the parameters of the central bank
reaction function that enter Ei(A￿). We now examine this procedure.
Private sector inference conditional on the central bank reaction
function
As before, producer i observes the interest rate, knowing that the central
bank follows a linear reaction function R = e ￿~ ￿1 + e ￿~ ￿2, and receives the
signals xi
k, k = 1;2, corresponding to the two fundamentals. Using Bayes
theorem, her estimates of the two fundamentals is as in (5) and (6). The
price decision of producer i is given by (7).
Producer i must estimate the central bank choice of ￿. She knows that
the central bank chooses ￿ to minimize ECB(pi ￿ A￿)2 but that ~ V
pr
￿;k =
EprECBV￿;k 6= V￿;k. Accordingly, following (9), the private sector expects
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In the neighborhood of e ￿ = 1; the solution is in the neighborhood of e ￿ = 1
when the second order condition 1￿2r+
￿
￿
￿ 0 is satis￿ed. Section 4.4 deals
with the alternative case. Following (10), a ￿rst order approximation is:
(20) e ￿ ￿ 1 =
(1 ￿ 3r + 2r2) +
￿
~ ￿








~ ￿ ￿ 1
￿
16This is similar to (10) and has the same interpretation.
Pricing
Once producer i has determined the value of e ￿ that she expects the central
bank to choose in deciding on the interest rate, she estimates Ei(￿k) from
observing the interest rate and receiving the signals xi
k on the two fundamen-






























Using these parameters in (7) delivers the pricing decision:
p
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1 ￿ [1 ￿ r(e ￿1 + e ￿2)]
These are exactly the same as in (7) and (8), the only di⁄erence being
that e ￿, the producer estimate of the central bank action, is based on ~ V
pr
￿;k ￿
EprECBV￿;k, her estimate of the central bank forecast instead of V￿;k itself
(even though producer i knows V￿;k).
The true central bank reaction function
So far, we have computed the private sector estimate of central bank expec-
tations (20), but the private sector does not know the later for sure (and
knows that it does not know). What will be the central bank choice of ￿?
The central bank will ￿rst extract information from its own signals e ￿1 and
e ￿2, using its forecasts V CB
￿;k ￿ ECBV￿;k: As before, we normalize on V CB
￿;2 and
















This is exactly the same situation as in Section 3.1. The loss expected
by the central bank ECB(pi ￿ A￿)2 is as in (9) with ￿
0 and ￿
0 instead of
￿ and ￿, respectively. When ￿
0 is in the neighborhood of 1, subject to the
second-order condition 1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿
￿ 0, the optimal policy parameter ￿
0 is
close to 1 and given by the suitably adjusted equation (10):
(23) ￿
0 ￿ 1 ’













Here again, we ￿nd the same result as (10), with the same interpretation.
Market equilibrium: the systematic bias
We now have a situation where the central bank chooses ￿
0 and sets the
interest rate according to R =
￿
0
1~ ￿ + ~ ￿2
1 + ￿
0 while the private sector looks at it
believing that it is R =
~ ￿~ ￿1 + ~ ￿2
1 + e ￿
. Inserting the true value of the interest rate
into (22) gives the actual market price equilibrium. As a deviation from its
fundamentals, it is:
p
i ￿ A￿ =
~ ’1 + ~ ’2e ￿
e ￿(1 + ￿
0)
(~ ￿1 ￿ ~ ￿2)(￿
0 ￿ e ￿)
+


























This expression includes three terms. The second and third ones involve
the signal errors of the central bank and of the private sector, respectively.
Such mispricing is unavoidable but is zero on average. The ￿rst term, on the
other hand is not nil on average. The discrepancy between the private sector
and the central bank information sets implies that the central bank￿ s choice
￿
0 given by (20) systematically di⁄ers from the corresponding private sector
18forecast e ￿ shown in (23). This discrepancy creates a systematic bias between
the price level and its fundamentals.8
Proposition 2 When the central bank and the private sector di⁄er in their
forecasts of the precision of private sector information, the interest rate be-
comes the source of a systematic bias between the price level and its funda-
mentals. The bias occurs irrespective of the relative precision of central bank
and private sector information.
The size of the systematic bias is proportional to the size of ￿
0 ￿ e ￿.
Consider again the two polar limit cases in the neighborhood of 1 for e ￿,
￿
0, e ￿ and ￿
0. From (20) and (23), we know that there is no bias (￿




! 1, while ￿
0 ￿ e ￿ ’ ￿
0 ￿e ￿ when
￿
￿
! 0. When the central bank is
well informed it relies on its own signals; with V ("1) = V ("2) it weighs both
signals equally and the private sector knows that, so the bias is eliminated.
On the contrary, when the central bank is poorly informed, it relies on its
estimate of private sector signals and sets ￿
0 = ￿
0; the private sector is aware
of this strategy but it imagines ~ ￿ = ~ ￿. This suggests that the systematic bias
is larger the less well-informed the central bank is.
4.2 The central bank is partially transparent
We consider now the case where the central bank reveals the interest rate
and its estimates of private sector variances V CB
￿;k - i.e. ￿
0 and ￿
0 - but not
its signals ~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2. The central bank choice, ￿
0 given by (23), rests on its
mistaken estimates ￿
0 and ￿
0 but this is now known to the private sector.
Accordingly ~ ￿ = ￿
0 and the systematic bias in (24) is eliminated:
p
i ￿ A￿ =


























where ~ ’k is as in (6) and (8) with ￿
0 instead of ￿, and the loss is L1 (￿;￿
0).
We evaluate this case in Section 4.5 below.
8The bias disappers when e ￿1 = e ￿2. This woud imply that there is a single fundamental.
In that case, revealing R would fully reveal the central bank choice up to the signal errors
that appear in the second and third terms.
194.3 The central bank is fully transparent
The central bank now reveals its estimates ￿
0 and ￿
0 as well as its own signals
~ ￿1 and ~ ￿2: This situation has already been treated in Section 3.2. Since ~ ￿1
and ~ ￿2 are known, the interest rate has no information value anymore and
the discrepancy of information precision between the central bank and the
previous sector does not create any systematic bias anymore. The optimal
forecast of producer i is given by (11) and (12), and the individual loss
remains as in (14).
When the central bank is fully transparent, the private sector knows
everything that the central bank knows, even though the central bank is
mistaken about the precision of private forecasts. Since the interest rate is
not informative anymore, the private sector ignores the ￿ awed signal that it
conveys.
Proposition 3 When the central bank and the private sectors have di⁄erent
information about the private sector precision, by revealing all its information
a poorly-informed central bank allows the private sector not to misinterpret
the interest rate signal.
4.4 Polar beliefs




￿ 0 is satis￿ed and the optimal ￿ is in the neighborhood of 1 when
￿ is close to unity. When this condition is not satis￿ed ￿ ’ 1 maximizes
the loss function and the optimal choice is ￿ = ￿
1
￿
. Section 3.3.2 examines
this case for the case where the variances are known. When the central bank
estimates of private sector variances are not known and the central bank sets
￿
0 while the private sector believes that the central bank has chosen ~ ￿, three





private sector believes ~ ￿ = ￿
1
~ ￿





private sector believes that ~ ￿ ’ 1; 3) the central bank chooses ￿
0 ’ ￿1 and
the private sector correctly believes that ~ ￿ ’ ￿1. We know from (24) that
￿
0 6= ~ ￿ produces a systematic bias and is therefore the source of a welfare
loss. This loss is largest when the central bank and the private sector each
aim at polar policy settings ￿
1
￿
0 and 1. This is not so.
From (24) we know that the bias it is proportional to
￿
0 ￿ ~ ￿







0and ~ ￿ = ￿
1
~ ￿
, the systematic bias is proportional to















, which is close in absolute value to 1. Finally,
￿
0 ’ 1 and ~ ￿ ’ ￿
1
~ ￿
leads to a bias proportional to
1 + ~ ￿
2
’ 1. Thus the bias
is in￿nite only when the central bank believes that it is poorly informed in the
face of strong private sector reactivity (
￿
￿
0 < 1￿2r) while the private sector
knows that this is not the case (
￿
~ ￿
￿ 1 ￿ 2r). The private sector attaches
value to the interest rate signal while the central bank purposefully attempts
to remove any information content from the rate. In the opposite case, when
central bank considers itself relatively well informed while the private sector
knows that it is not so, the latter simply discards the information that the
former attempts to convey via the interest rate, and the bias is ￿nite.
4.5 Welfare comparisons
We now compare the welfare properties of the three degrees of transparency
previously studied. To summarize:
1) No transparency: the central bank only publishes the interest rate.
It chooses ￿
0 given by (23), but the private sector believes that it is ~ ￿ as





, is the unconditional
expectation E(pi ￿ A￿)2 where pi is given by (24).
2) Partial transparency: in addition to the interest rate, the central bank
reveals its (mistaken) estimates of private sector variances V CB
￿;k , hence ￿
0 and
￿
0. It chooses ￿
0 and the private sector is aware of this. The loss, which is
computed using the correct (and private estimates of) variances V￿;k, hence
using ￿ and ￿, is denoted L1 (￿;￿
0) = E(pi ￿ A￿)2 where pi is set according
to (25).
3) Full transparency: the central bank additionally reveals its signals ~ ￿1
and ~ ￿2, which renders the choice of R, and therefore of ￿, uninformative.
The corresponding loss L2 (￿) is given by (14).
Note ￿rst that the central bank￿ s erroneous forecast of private variances
implies L1 (￿;￿
0) > Arg minL1 (￿;x) = L1 (￿), where L1 (￿), the optimal
loss when the variances are known to both the central bank and the private
sector, is computed in Section 3.1. It follows that whenever L1 (￿) > L2 (￿)
full transparency is the socially optimal strategy. However, at least in the
21polar cases studied in Section 3.3.2, this condition is never satis￿ed, so we
need to compare directly the corresponding values of the loss function. This
is not possible in general. Accordingly we focus on the neighborhood of ￿ = 1
and make some additional simplifying assumptions.
4.5.1 Partial vs. full transparency
We compare L1 (￿;￿
0) and L2 (￿). With ￿ as the optimal policy choice when
the variances are known (see Section 3), we assume that the central bank
decision error ￿
0￿￿, which depends on its information errors, is an exogenous
random variable with zero mean and variance E (￿
0 ￿ ￿)





> 0, the optimal ￿ is close to 1, and a Taylor expansion
around ￿ = 1 gives:
L1 (￿;￿























Using (16), we have in the neighborhood of ￿ ’ ￿ ’ 1:
(26)
L1 (￿;￿
0) ￿ L2 (￿) ’
V
￿





























i.e. when the private sector is not too reactive, the beauty
contest e⁄ect is weak. In that case, it matters whether the variance of the
central bank decision error E (￿
0 ￿ ￿)
2 = V is large or not relatively to the




(￿￿1)2 < 1, there is some scope for interest manipulation.9 In this
case we have:
9When r is very small, full transparency is always optimal because the beauty contest




< a1 L1 (￿;￿




< a2 L1 (￿;￿
0) < L2 (￿)
￿
￿
> a2 L1 (￿;￿
0) > L2 (￿)
where a1 and a2 depend on r and
q
V
(￿￿1)2(see the Appendix for details).
Except for a range a1 <
￿
￿
< a2, it is preferable for the central bank
for the be fully transparent. Within the range, however, the central bank
should be partially transparent. When
￿
￿
is low, the central bank is too
poorly informed to be able to e⁄ectively manipulate the interest rate, so it
should be fully transparent. When
￿
￿
is large, the high precision of central
bank information justi￿es revealing all its information, as in M&S. In the
intermediate range the central bank raises welfare by setting the interest




(￿￿1)2 > 1, L1 (￿;￿
0) > L2 (￿), the central bank decision error is rela-
tively large, which means that its e⁄ectiveness at manipulating the interest
rate is weak. In that case, it is always preferable that the central bank be
fully rather than partially transparent. The common knowledge e⁄ect a⁄ect-
ing the interest rate is worse, from a welfare viewpoint, than the common
knowledge e⁄ect from the signals themselves. This result holds independently




, i.e. when the beauty contest e⁄ect is strong, we have:
￿
￿
< a3 L1 (￿;￿
0) < L2 (￿)
￿
￿
> a3 L1 (￿;￿
0) > L2 (￿)
When its relative precision is low the central bank should be partially
transparent, and fully transparent when the relative precision is above a
threshold. In comparison with the case above, even when its precision is very
low the central bank can use the interest rate to orient private expectations
because the private sector is highly reactive.
- When 1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿
< 0, the optimal ￿ = ￿
1
￿
. The Appendix shows that
L1 (￿;￿
0)￿L2 (￿) is the same as the sign of (4 ￿ V ). Although we assume that
23V = E(￿









is unconditional, it is reasonable to consider that it is small, which implies
that L1 (￿;￿
0) < L2 (￿). Half transparency now dominates full transparency
because it allows a relatively poorly informed central bank to conceal the
signal value of the interest rate by increasing its variance. Indeed a small V
means that the di⁄erence of information sets between the central bank and
the private sector does not create any large discrepancy between ￿
0; chosen
by the central bank sets the interest rate, and the interpretation ￿ of the
private sector.
4.5.2 Partial vs. no transparency






0). As before we assume that ￿
0￿￿
is white noise u1 with exogenous variance V . We also need to consider the
private sector forecast error ~ ￿ = Epr (￿
0). We assume that this step involves
an additive error u2 which is white noise with unconditional variance V2 and
u1 and u2 are taken as orthogonal: Intuitively, we consider that expectations
of expectations additively increase the variance of forecast errors.
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￿
￿



































1 ￿ r +
￿
￿
￿2 > 0 (28)
Even though its information is of poor quality, by releasing its forecasts of
private sector precision, the central bank eliminates the systematic bias. In
24addition, it saves the private sector from having mistaken forecast the policy
choice ￿
0; which gives rise to V2.
When 1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿






























1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿
2(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ r))
2 > 0
This establishes that, in comparison to only setting the interest rate,
the central bank raises welfare by revealing its forecasts of private sector
precision, even though its precision is relatively poor.
4.5.3 Implication and interpretation








Proposition 4 The precision of the central bank information is unknown,
from a welfare viewpoint, full transparency generally dominates partial trans-
parency, which dominates no transparency. It is better for the central bank to
be half transparent - issuing variance forecasts that a⁄ect the private sector
interpretation of the interest rate - when the central bank information preci-
sion is relatively low and the private sector is highly reactive and therefore
manipulable.
These results stand in sharp contrast with those of M&S. Partial trans-
parency improves over no transparency because in the latter case the private
sector misinterprets the interest rate, which introduces a systematic bias be-
tween the price level and its fundamentals. The bias can be large because of
the common knowledge e⁄ect. Full transparency improves over partial trans-
parency because we assume here that the central bank forecasts of private
sector precision are erroneous. As a consequence, it chooses an interest rate
that is both misleading and a source of common knowledge e⁄ect. When it
directly releases its signals, a transparent central bank does not avoid the
common knowledge e⁄ect but, at least, the signals are not shrouded in fog.
Two of the three exceptions occur when the central bank is poorly in-
formed and when the private sector is highly reactive. In both cases, the
poor signal quality leads to large common pool e⁄ects as in M&S while the
25reactivity of the private sector provides an opportunity to manipulate the
interest rate, in one case even to use the interest rate signal to deliberately
being opaque and thus avoid any misinterpretation. The third exception
concerns a situation of intermediate relative central bank precision and low
public sector reactivity where the central bank makes a su¢ ciently small er-
ror in setting the interest rate that its ability to a⁄ect private sector forecasts
compensate the common knowledge e⁄ect attached to the interest rate. 10
5 The private sector is mistaken about its
own variances
In Section 4 we assume the private sector precision is unknown to the central
bank but known to the private sector. This section brie￿ y looks at a more
symmetric setup where the private sector does not know either its own vari-
ance. Its estimates of ￿ and ￿ are denoted ^ ￿ and ^ ￿. Unaware of its erroneous
forecasts, the private sector therefore uses ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ to estimate ￿ in the cen-
tral bank interest rate rule. Note that the losses are still computed using the
true values ￿ and ￿.
We use the following notation for the welfare losses:
- The central bank is not transparent, i.e. it only publishes the interest
rate: ~ L1(￿
0; ~ ￿; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿)
- The central bank is partially transparent, i.e. it additionally reveals its
variance estimates: L1(￿
0; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿)
- The central bank is fully transparent, i.e. it additionally reveals its
signals: L2(￿
0;^ ￿;￿).
The following results are established in the Appendix:
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0; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) ? L2(^ ￿;^ ￿;￿)






< a3, and 1 ￿ 2r +
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26Thus we reach the same conclusion as in Section 4: it is generally prefer-
able for the central bank to be transparent whether the relative precision of




! 0 re￿ ects two sources of welfare losses that can be seen
from the Appendix. When the central bank is half transparent, its mistaken
choice of ￿
0 plays a major role in determining L1(￿
0; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) while with full
transparency L2(^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) is mostly in￿ uenced by the private sector error ^ ￿
(the central bank￿ s error on ^ ￿ a⁄ects both losses).




we only consider the polar case
￿
￿
! 0. Here again, the conclusions from
Section 4 generally hold.
6 Conclusions
The in￿ uential result by M&S, that a central bank should not be transparent,
rests on the intuitive ￿ ute-player e⁄ect. In a world of imperfectly-informed
agents who face a strong incentive to converge to the mean (the beauty con-
test e⁄ect) signals that are known to be observed by all (common knowledge)
strongly a⁄ect expectations. Everyone follows the ￿ ute-payer. If these signals
are of poor quality, the e⁄ect can be welfare-reducing as the ￿ ute-player be-
comes the head-sheep that jumps o⁄ the cli⁄. As noted by Svensson (2005),
the conclusion that central bank transparency may be undesirable rests on
the dubious assumption that the central bank is relatively less well informed
than the previous sector. Yet, the ￿ ute-player e⁄ect stands.
In this paper, we show that the ￿ ute-player e⁄ect is not necessarily
welfare-reducing. An interest rate-setting central bank can use this e⁄ect
to mitigate the common knowledge e⁄ect. Put di⁄erently, an optimizing
￿ ute player does not jump of the cli⁄; he may also decide to charm away his
followers in the direction or even to hide in the bushes to distill his music
when the fog is thick.
The key intuition is that a central bank must anyway set a publicly vis-
ible interest rate, so complete opaqueness of the sort envisioned by M&S is
technically impossible (the ￿ ute player must play the ￿ ute). Thus the cen-
tral bank must release some information, the interest rate, and it faces two
decisions: how to set the interest rate and whether to additionally reveal
some or all of its own information? As it sets the interest rate, and is well
aware that this will serve as a signal that can be over-interpreted because it
is common knowledge, the central bank may use the interest rate to mitigate
27the undesirable e⁄ect of the signal.
In addition, we allow for some fog when we let the precision of the signals
received by the central bank and by the private sector be unknown. As a
consequence, the signal extraction e⁄orts of the private sector may not only
unduly respond to the central bank, they may also be distorted by a mistaken
appraisal of the precision of the signals. This is why, the central bank can
dissipate the fog in which it is caught by releasing its own forecast of the
private sector precision. Even if this forecast is erroneous, it dissipates the
fog.
The conclusions depend very much on what is known about the preci-
sion of private and central bank information. If the precision is known, the
￿ ute-player e⁄ect is upheld but the central bank can optimally set the inter-
est rate to mitigate the common knowledge e⁄ect; the ￿ ute player here is a
shrewd optimizer. In this case, as a ￿rst approximation, the desirability of
releasing the signals depend as in M&S on the quality of the central bank
information and on the reactivity of the private sector to each other￿ s expec-
tations. If, however, the precision is unknown, the interest rate is not as fully
informative anymore. It becomes a noisy signal of the central bank informa-
tion. The release of additional information by the central bank - actually all
its information - now generally improves the situation. The reason is that
the information eliminates the mistake that the private sector makes when
interpreting the observed interest rate. This example vindicates those who,
like Blinder (1998), argue that the central bank ought to be fully transparent
precisely to prevent mistaken inferences of its actions by the private sector.
The di⁄erence between this paper and M&S carries an intriguing inter-
pretation. Their central bank is like the Federal Reserve before 1993, when
it was not publishing the interest rate. Our central bank, like any modern
central bank, immediately indicates its interest rate decisions. While the
old Fed may have found it desirable to be fully opaque, as Morris and Shin
suggest that it may be desirable when the central bank information is poor,
we ￿nd that, in general, the new Fed may raise welfare by being transparent.
The paper su⁄ers from several limitations that should be kept in mind
before drawing ￿rm policy conclusions. To start with, the interest rate plays
no macroeconomic role in our model. Its only function is to convey some
information about the central bank signals. This explains why we ￿nd that,
in some instances, the central bank should considerably raise the variance
of the interest rate, as if the ￿ ute player would be hiding to avoid being
followed. This is quite unrealistic and requires an extension, but it succeeds
in allowing us to isolate the information content of the interest rate and to
see how common knowledge of the interest rate a⁄ects the results of M&S.
In addition, we treat as exogenous the variances of the forecast errors. Still,
28we believe that our paper shows that the conclusions of M&S are not robust
to reasonable extensions of their papers.
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30Appendix
Derivation of (7)
Iterating expectations as in (4), we have:
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(1 ￿ r￿2) ￿ r2 ￿1￿2





￿ (1 ￿ r￿1) ￿ r2 ￿1￿2
￿ ￿(1 ￿ r)r
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5 and on the left hand-side
by A leads directly, after some simpli￿cations, to (7).
32Derivation of (17)
Combining (9) and (14), we have:






￿ + (1 ￿ r)
2
￿(￿
￿ + (1 ￿ r))2 + ￿
￿ ￿
￿ + (1 ￿ r)
2
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(￿ + 1)2r ￿ (￿ + 1) ￿






















A + O(￿ ￿ 1) < 0
Derivation of results of Section 4.5.1
We start with the case 1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿
> 0. In order to determine the sign of
(26), we ￿rst look at two limit cases. When
￿
￿
! 0, with the second order
condition now 1 ￿ 2r > 0, L1 (￿;￿







is of the same
sign as 1 ￿ 2r. When
￿
￿
! 1, L1 (￿;￿
0) ￿ L2 (￿) ! V
2￿ > 0. Next note that
the denominator of (26) is positive when 1 ￿ 2r +
￿
￿
> 0. Denote N the



















































































> 0 we are interested in positive
roots only. The discriminant of this expression is ￿4Wr+W 2r2+6Wr2+r2.
33It is positive for r > 4 W
W2+6W+1. Since 4 W
W2+6W+1 ￿ 1
2, a su¢ cient condition





￿2W + 3Wr + r +
p
(￿4Wr + W 2r2 + 6Wr2 + r2)
￿
We know that when 1 ￿ 2r < 0, L1 (￿;￿





0) ￿ L2 (￿) > 0 when
￿
￿
! 1. This establishes the result reported in
Section 4.5.1.
When 1 ￿ 2r > 0; we know that L1 (￿;￿





- If r > 2W





￿2W + 3Wr + r ￿
p






￿2W + 3Wr + r +
p
(￿4Wr + W 2r2 + 6Wr2 + r2)
￿
and the limit cases determine the sign of L1 (￿;￿
0) ￿ L2 (￿).
- If r < 2W
3W+1, there is no positive root. (This case is only possible if :
4 W
W2+6W+1 < 2W
3W+1 that is W > 1.) The limit cases imply that L1 (￿;￿
0) ￿









0) = L1 (￿;￿) +
￿
￿














0) ￿ L2 (￿) = L1 (￿;￿) ￿ L2 (￿) +
￿
￿

















￿ + (1 ￿ r)
￿2 (V ￿ 4)
34Derivation of (28)
Considering the case ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ ￿ ￿
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(￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ 2r))



















(￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ 2r))
(￿ (1 ￿ r) + ￿)
2
Derivation of results in Section 5
The second order condition is satis￿ed When the central bank is par-
tially transparent, the unconditional expectation of the loss is:
L1(￿

























































2 (2￿r + ￿ + ￿)
￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)
4 E
￿






(1 ￿ r)(3￿r + ￿r ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)
4 E
￿
^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2
When the central bank is not transparent, the unconditional expectation
of the loss is:
~ L1(￿
0; ~ ￿; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) = ~ L1(~ ￿;￿) + A
= L1(~ ￿;￿) + Bias term + A
The loss decomposes into three terms where A.comes from the correction
due to ^ ￿;^ ￿. At our order of approximation A = B. L1(~ ￿;￿) and the bias
term is similar to the one obtained in Section 4.
When the central bank is fully transparent, the unconditional expectation
of the loss is:
L2(￿




￿ + (^ ￿)
2
￿ (1 ￿ r)
2
￿





￿ + ￿(^ ￿)
2
￿ (1 ￿ r)
2
￿





that can be written as:
L2(^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) = L2 (￿) + C
with:
C = ￿￿￿
(1 ￿ r)(3￿r + ￿r ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)
4 E
￿




￿ + ￿ + 2￿r




^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2
Given the results from Section 4, noting that A = B, we have:
~ L1(￿
0; ~ ￿; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) ￿ L1(￿
0; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) = ~ L1(~ ￿;￿) + A ￿ L1(￿
0;￿) ￿ B
= L1(~ ￿;￿) ￿ L1(￿
0;￿) + Bias term > 0
The other comparison is:
L1(￿
0; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) ￿ L2(^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) = L1(￿
0;￿) ￿ L2 (￿) + B ￿ C
L1(￿




(1 ￿ r)(3￿r + ￿r ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)
4
￿
^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2
36Using our previous results about the losses L1(￿






0; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿)￿L2(^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) = E (￿
0 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿(1 ￿ 2r)






^ ￿ ￿ ￿
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The second order condition is not satis￿ed When the optimal policy











￿ (2r ￿ 1)￿
￿










































^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2
(1 ￿ r)
2 > L2 (￿)
for ￿ close to 1.






0) > 0: By the same
arguments as above, we have:
~ L1(￿
0; ~ ￿; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) ￿ L1(￿
0; ^ ￿;^ ￿;￿) > 0
Now computing L1(￿
0;￿;￿
0;^ ￿) as previously leads to:
L1(￿







where the variance terms are of order E
￿









This formula yields the same result as in Section 4.
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